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SCHISM IN THE BULGARIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND ITS  REPERCUSSIONS ON
RELIGIOUS DEVELOPM ENTS AND THE NEW LAW OF CONFESSIONS.
By Janice Broun
Janice Broun (Scottish Episcopal Church) graduated from Oxford University. She
has written prolifically about churches in Eastern Europe, including articles in this
publication, including one on the Bulgarian Orthodox schism (see Vo. XIII, No. 3,
June 1993). 
In 1992 the reformist United Democratic Forces (UDF) government used a hangover from
communism, the Board of Religious Affairs (BRA), and made a disastrous foray into the affairs of the
Bulgarian Orthodox Church, to which 85 percent of Bulgarians, six and a half million, nominally
belong.  The schism this action provoked still rumbles on eleven years later.  Under the pretext that the
election of Patriarch Maksim back in 1971 was rigged, and therefore invalid, the government declared
the Church's ruling body, the Holy Synod, illegitimate.  They chose to ignore the obvious fact that
under communism no elections of officials were free.  The Holy Synod--somewhat of a misnomer
since several of its members were police agents--was replaced by a Provisional Synod headed by
Maksim's close colleague, the maverick Metropolitan Pimen of Nevrokop.  The opposition Bulgarian
Socialist Party (BSP), which was the communist party recycled, backed Maksim and the Holy Synod. 
Since Pimen and the defecting metropolitans like Pankrati of Stara Zagora and Kalinik of
Vratsa had been even more compromised by their assiduity in executing communist policies than
Maksim, the raskolniks (schismatics) lacked credibility. The main protagonist of the schism, the monk
Khristofer Subev, had in 1989 earned a considerable reputation with democratic Bulgarians and
observers abroad as a champion of religious rights.  After the overthrow of the communists, under the
banner of the UDF, Subev challenged the complacent Holy Synod to push ahead with urgently needed
church reform.  I met him in 1990 and again in 1992, the second time in the Holy Synod palace,
barricaded against a possible assault from the canonical synod's supporters. Although eager to explain
the situation, he completely lacked charisma.  By 1993 he had parted from the other raskolniks and
declared himself a bishop. He proved to be unbalanced and was unmasked as a former security officer.
He was just one of the many infiltrated into Sofia Theological Academy during the later years of
communism in order to obtain key posts in the higher echelons of the clergy and eventually to destroy
the church from within. Alexander Gospodinov, a teacher there, estimated that by 1990 probably half
of his students were police agents or had been turned into informers.  He had long had good reasons to
suspect Subev.  
Apart from the UDF, the raskolniks drew support from a minority of reformist priests and
church members disillusioned by the Holy Synod. The majority, whatever their justifiable reservations
about the integrity of their bishops, stood by the canonical church.  It is conceivable that that genuine
He later qualified the latter claim - but Metropolitan Kiril of Varna's enthusiasm for Levski, and1
Galaktion of Stara Zagora's for Beroe is notorious!
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UDF reformists, who were also theologically ignorant and knew nothing of canon law, were misled by
forces intent on dividing the church, seizing or retaining its assets and staunching any prospects of
Orthodox renewal.  
If so, these forces have achieved their aim. Throughout the schism, it has been obvious that
the dispute is not over theology or dogma, but about power and the possession of church property.
Despite the indifference to religion which was prevalent even before the communist onslaught some
Bulgarians kept their Orthodox faith in their hearts and homes and were open to religion. Many were
open and prepared to look to their traditional church for moral and spiritual leadership to guide them
through the appalling problems of post-communist economic collapse. There was widespread
expectation that the entire Holy Synod would formally admit its guilt in collaborating with the
communists. When this did not happen the UDF government tried to capitalize on the subsequent
disillusion by creating a rival synod. Although the Holy Synod promised to convene a National Subor
(Church Council), it was seven years before it materialized. There, no apologies were forthcoming,
expectations of urgently needed reforms in church administration were not fully realized and
discussions on sensitive issues such as the new private church bank, widely believed to be a cover for
laundering dirty money, were quashed. The major cause for discontent within the church, the yawning
gulf between the bishops and the parish clergy was not addressed. One problem, raised by Gospodinov
as a lay member of the second Subor, held in 2001, was the size of the metropolitanates, which
preclude close contact between bishops and their clergy. Greece has 70 metropolitans; Bulgaria, with
only a slightly smaller population, has only 13. The church's limited resources were mismanaged, and
the only priests with enough to live on are those in flourishing city churches. In one diocese priests'
stipends were six months in arrears.
According to Archimandrite Pavel Stefanov, a Shumen University lecturer whose views on
the Holy Synod generally reflect the popular consensus; “Maksim and his synod did almost nothing to
improve the image of the church in this country and abroad and it has lost most of its prestige. Their
activities are limited to liturgies and long dinners. Few books are published, church periodicals are at
an all time low, no circular was ever issued to found Sunday schools or youth societies. The church is
just left to drift or rather to rot. Many priests are trying desperately to feed their struggling families
because they get hardly any salaries while bishops are driving around in limousines and donating
millions to football clubs”.1
Sensing the vacuum, sects and cults abound. Constant altercation and demeaning antics
including street fights and sieges of key church properties by both sides in the schism left people
indifferent and disillusioned. A great opportunity was lost, not least among the enthusiastic youngsters
who since 1990 had enrolled in expanded seminary and theological education. The young women who
Valentin Kozhuharov, a leading religious educationalist, in a letter to the author. It is a significant2
comment on the lack of opportunities in this field that Kozhiharov and his wife transferred to work in
Russia.
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looked forward to teaching religion in schools or finding employment in church institutions found
themselves confronted by a conservative, hidebound, male dominated establishment. The graduates
were appalled to find themselves competing with former communist teachers who had been given a
crash course to qualify. Less than seven per cent of the properly qualified and trained theological
teaching graduates were able to find employment although the second UDF government-- to its credit--
re-introduced religious education as an optional school subject in 1997, though only for Orthodox, but
later extended to the substantial Muslim Turkish community. Many of the graduates have sought a
future elsewhere--often abroad. Since only one per cent of school children receive religious education,
most Bulgarian children are as distant from the church as ever. It is thanks to grassroots initiative from
theologians, educated priests and concerned layfolk that since 1999 seventy-nine parish Sunday
schools have been set up to provide the basic spiritual and moral guidance they are convinced children
need.2
Despite re-iterated pleas from several directions for Patriarch Maksim (now eighty nine) to
resign and leave the field to a younger, more dynamic successor, he has stood his ground. In 1996 a
raskolnik national subor elected its figurehead Pimen - who was even older - as a rival patriarch. In
1997 during the widespread pro-democracy demonstrations which caused the collapse of the
compromised BSP government and brought the UDF back to power, it was Pimen who seized the
initiative, reflecting popular feeling. Nevertheless, since Pimen's death three years later there has been
no move to elect his successor, Innokenti, 'Metropolitan' of Sofia, as patriarch.  
In 1998 the Pan-Orthodox Council with a flotilla of patriarchs under the Ecumenical Patriarch
Bartholomaios descended on Sofia to read the riot act.  They endorsed Maksim and the Holy Synod
and after tortuous negotiations to persuade the reluctant raskolniks to proffer their repentance, they
declared the schism at an end. They even generously re-instated raskolnik metropolitans as titular
bishops.
The raskolnik promises were not worth the paper they were written on; they promptly called
another council which, backed by hardliner UDF government members, 'deposed' Maksim. All
attempts to reconcile the two sides, including those of the former (UDF) President Petur Stoyanov,
have failed.
The root of the Church's problems stems not only from persecution and subjugation under
communism but from Bulgaria's chequered past. It has never been able to make up for five centuries
under Ottoman domination (which ended not much more than a century ago) when it was forced to
keep a very low profile and was completely cut off from church life and theological developments in
the rest of Europe. Even in freedom since 1870 the Church was still handicapped and marginalized
because of its schismatic status with other Orthodox Churches, which was only lifted in 1945. Its
“Intoleranz oder Toleranz?” GLAUBE IN DER 2 WELT No 1 1999 p. 4 and “Bulgarie”,3
SERVICE ORTHODOXE DE PRESSE No 232 November 1998, p 13.
 “Bulgarian Church asked to return to Ecumenical fold,” WCC Press 6 June 2003.4
“Bulgarian Church expected to rejoin ecumenism,” Bulgarian national radio, 5 September 2003.5
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resources and land endowments, with some exceptions like the extensive Rila monastery mountains,
were very limited. Restrictions by the inter-war government prevented it from providing the people
with an effective religious education. Even among apparently Orthodox educated Bulgarians
tendencies towards theosophy and esoteric beliefs often lie not far below the surface.  
The fact that only two patriarchs and no-one higher than a low-key bishop from the Moscow
Patriarchate turned up at the Bulgarian Patriarchate's fiftieth anniversary celebration in 2003 could
signal the growing impatience of other Orthodox churches with the Bulgarian church's failure to put its
house in order. 
In 1998 the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was withdrawn by its Holy Synod from the World
Council of Churches, mainly as a protest against what was seen as large scale proselytism within
Bulgaria by foreign missionaries under the aegis of long-standing fellow WCC members. The bishops
claimed that the gap between Orthodox and Protestants had widened, and that proselytism was
confusing people's understanding of Orthodoxy. Was the Holy Synod trying to tap into public hostility
to the WCC to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the raskolniks? 
Members of the Bulgarian Evngelical Alliance regarded the withdrawal as a retrograde step,
accusing the Bulgarian Orthodox Church of exploiting ecumenism under communism solely to further
its own interests. Their repeated attempts to establish good relations with it had been rebuffed. They
touched a raw nerve when they implied that behind the decision lurked political elements seeking to
exploit Orthodoxy for their own ends and to impede Bulgaria's integration into Europe. Replying,
Orthodox spokesman Peter Grammatikov denied that his church was under pressure. He argued that the
very opposite was the case; it was the main victim of persecution with a government which refused to
recognize the synod under Patriarch Maksim.  In fact, the church did continue to send representatives3
to various conferences, mainly those concerned with Orthodoxy and with rebuilding inter-church co-
operation in the Balkans in the wake of the wars, but could not always afford to do so. In comparison
with neighboring Romania theological education has never been adequately developed and there is a
dire shortage of outstanding teachers. So far the Holy Synod has remained unresponsive to re-iterated
pleas from the WCC to return. This summer the Greek Archbishop Christodoulos along with leading
Orthodox theologians added their entreaties.  Former WCC official Todor Subev pointed out how his4
church had distanced itself from ecclesiastical Europe and lost out on substantial cash grants for
development.  5
In one respect inter-faith relations are cordial. Because of the Orthodox Church's leading role
in protecting 48,000 Bulgarian Jews from deportation during the war, Bulgaria has been regarded very
favorably by Jewish organizations and a number of ceremonies commemorating 'the righteous among
Emil Cohen, “Leaders of Evangelical Churches condemn the wave of anti-Semitism in the6
country,” BULGARIAN TOLERANCE FOUNDATION, press release, 20 February 2002.
STANDART, 8 June 2000.7
“Bishop welcomes recognition,” Dnevnik, 4 June 2003.8
ZENIT-ORG, Rome, May 21-27, 2002.9
“Commemoration of Neo-Martyrs,” www.focus-news net, 11 March 2003. 10
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nations' take place. Despite impassioned defense of the Jews by leading Orthodox, anti-Semitism
remained rampant among ordinary people. After the war 30,000 Bulgarian Jews voted with their feet.
Now only 3000 remain and they have not been spared a resurgence of anti-semitism, which has been
courageously denounced by Evangelical leaders, but not by the Holy Synod.  6
The alternative synod, particularly under Pimen, tended to look to other schismatic Orthodox
churches for support, in particular, to Metropolitan Filaret (Denisenko), head of the Kievan Patriarchate
of Ukraine, who sought to create a sort of schismatic 'Internationale', and also to the Macedonian
Orthodox Church. The latter had become the 'de facto' Orthodox Church in Macedonia since Tito's
creation of a Macedonian republic in 1945 but its relations with the church it had left, the Serbian
Orthodox Church, have remained very tense. With the Bulgarian government's recognition of
Macedonia in 1999 there have also been occasional exchanges with the canonical synod. Maksim was
the only Orthodox patriarch to intercede with the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomaios for recognition
of the Macedonian church.  Last summer Metropolitan Kalinik served a liturgy in Macedonia with7
Metropolitan Peter and predicted that his church would be the first local Orthodox Church to endorse
the Macedonian Church.8
The Catholic Church, about 44,000 strong, is deeply rooted in Bulgaria's history. It has
emerged from a constricted ghetto existence and still has to depend largely on expatriate clergy but is
active and its personnel are well respected. The Vatican had cleared Bulgaria of complicity in the
attempt on the Pope's life and beatified Bishop Eugene Bosilkov, martyred in 1952, in 1998. However
Maksim and the Holy Synod showed little enthusiasm for John Paul II's visit last year; the initiative for
the invitation came from the current government, the Simeon II National Movement (SND) under
Prime Minister Simeon Sakskoburggotsky (the former tsar), who had spent most of his life in exile in
Spain and whose wife is a Catholic.
At an official level and in Sofia, Orthodox response was reserved, some Holy Synod
metropolitans refusing to kiss the Pope's hand; but in Plovdiv, the main Catholic center, in front of
maybe 25,000 enthusiastic believers, Metropolitan Arseniy of Plovdiv even spoke warmly of
convergence between Orthodox and Catholic churches. The Pope beatified other Catholic martyrs and
his appeal to young people there to become the salt and life of society, was exactly the challenge young
Bulgarians needed, but rarely heard from their own bishops.   It had been left to an independent9
committee to collect individual donations and in 2001 to erect a Wall of Memory commemorating
victims of communism and listing martyrs of all faiths and it was the raskolnik Innokenti, who has
close links with Sofia's mayor Stefan Sofiansky, who dedicated it.  As for the Holy Synod, it delayed10
“Bulgarian Orthodox Church given use of Roman parish church,” CWNews. com, 21 May 2003.11
Pavel Stefanov, “Priests kill priest; killing - the aftermath,” BGNews and information supplied12
by Gospodinov.
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official commemoration services for its martyrs until July 2003, and then on a weekday, not a Sunday,
when few people would attend. Perhaps this reflected guilty consciences on the part of some former
collaborationist figures? Following the papal visit the Vatican generously gifted a church in Rome for
the use of the Bulgarian community.11
Over the years the alternative synod has lost support, with some members like Metropolitan
Kalinik of Vratsa, a very obvious communist appointee, deciding their future lay with the canonical
synod. 'Of those of us who attend church every Sunday,' Gospodinov told me, 'over 90 per cent back
the patriarch. The raskol supporters are often folk who go once a year - mainly people who do it for
political considerations.' Some UDF members, like Gospodinov, have grave reservations about their
party's continued support of an uncanonical church. Yet in some localities the situation is still very
strained. Ownership of key church estates is, according to many observers, what keeps the schism
going. In 2000, trustees and priests of Blagoevgrad Cathedral in Pimen's former see decided to rejoin
the canonical church but the supporters of his schismatic successor Gavril remained in occupation for
five days, backed by a police cordon; when Patriarch Maksim arrived he was not allowed inside. He
and his supporters in the canonical church had to demonstrate in Sofia in front of the offices of the
president and premier before the public prosecutor rescinded the local police order. Such was the
antagonism unleashed among some participants that in 2002 a hot-tempered raskolnik priest, Stefan
Kamberov, was murdered by a 'canonical' one during a scuffle over a profitable monastic property in
Nevrokop diocese in south west Bulgaria.  This dispute was by no means the last in an unedifying12
saga of occupations, barricades and attacks on contested churches, but this was the first time life had
been lost. People all over Bulgaria were stunned. The people taken into custody for the act were later
released. Though in Sandanski people demonstrated for an end to violence, some raskolniks launched
an ill-informed and vicious hate campaign against Patriarch Maksim and Metropolitan Natanail of
Nevrokop. One of those who made accusations was Associate Professor Kalin Yanakiev, a church
member. In 2003 he turned against both hierarchies, accusing them of being far more closely connected
with the big bosses of the criminal world and the 'mafia', than with believers and clergy. Some of his
allegations may not be wide of the mark. There is no doubt that the Holy Synod is still contaminated by
people with discreditable life styles who are patently former security plants. In fairness, the synod also
contains good people, but lacks any obvious, towering personality to challenge or succeed the not very
bright or inspiring Maksim. Inevitably, it is deeply divided--as it is in orientation with Orthodox
churches outside. The majority still look to the Moscow Patriarch, whose party-line they followed for
years. 
Two metropolitans look to Greece, while Metropolitans Dometian of Vidin and Neofit of
Dorostol-Cherven, Makism's most likely successor, are more open to the west. The latest election, to
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Silistra, aroused a bitter dispute and was only resolved with the appointment of a 92-year-old, Ilarion.
However odd this seems, the election was popular, as Ilarion, a prolific writer on theology, author of
eight books over the last decade, is hale and hearty and determined to do all he can for his church. He
is well respected by both sides in the schism. 
To its credit, during the NATO attack on Yugoslavia in 1999, the Holy Synod, in sharp
contrast to the Moscow Patriarchate, unequivocally condemned Slobodan Milosevi's and the Serbian
government's policies particularly against its own Albanian citizens as "an insult to Orthodoxy; it is not
possible for such a war and such slaughter to be fomented in the name of Christianity." Inter-Orthodox
solidarity, it stated, could not condone Milosevi's vicious crimes which only served to increase
tensions between Balkan states.
None of the religious groups existing in pre-war Bulgaria have achieved satisfaction in the
restitution of all their property. As long as Orthodox, and nearly a million Muslims too, were kept
waiting for their property they remained financially dependent on the state and open to manipulation by
it. Until the SND government took the matter in hand with their new Law of Confessions in 2002, the
schism's continuance provided successive governments with a convenient excuse for delaying
restitution, on the pretext that they did not know which side should be given it. Certainly, the prolonged
economic crisis, allied to probable misappropriation here and there by the church's mafia element,
accentuated the Bulgarian Orthodox Church's financial problems. The Orthodox Church has been at a
disadvantage when compared with flourishing evangelical churches and sects, some of which are
heavily subsidized from abroad. Stefanov's comment is apposite; "Evangelization is proselytism when
one side has a lot of money and the other is poor and apathetic." For instance, the Holy Synod made no
attempt at systematic provision of new churches in the extensive churchless city suburbs; the first new
one in Sofia was not dedicated until 1999. 
If, in comparison, the Evangelical churches have made such headway, with, currently, a
member growth rate of 17 percent a year, with the Pentecostalist Church of God alone expanding from
a few thousand in 1989 to 45,000, the Orthodox--in both synods-- have mainly themselves to blame.
Though there are Orthodox projects to help the needy, including some concerned parishes and the only
recently founded Pokrom, a nationwide lay charity, the minority churches have far more initiative and
their contribution in outreach to the disadvantaged, orphans, the homeless and the Roma in particular,
is out of all proportion to their size. Evangelism of the unchurched is not on the Orthodox program.
Gospodinov deplores the continued use of Church Slavonic and, as a lay representative, reminded the
2001 Subor that 35 years ago the independent minded Metropolitan Iosif of Varna and Preslav had
introduced modern Bulgarian into the liturgy in his diocese. He believes that it will be impossible to
reclaim the 'lost' Orthodox until the church is prepared to meet them where they are and provide
services they can understand. Even many priests hardly understand what they chant.
“Among certain circles there is a lot of effort to keep Church Slavonic” he told me. “It is
basically political; the idea is to keep our church and laity in closer contact with the Russian and
“Chants in the vernacular.” Bulgarian National Radio, 26 December 2003.13
“Metropolitan pillaried at conference,” CHERNOMORIE, 14 November 2003.14
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV, 2 (April 2004) page 26.
Serbian churches which use Church Slavonic. The Romanians on the other hand have made successful
use of their vernacular.” Sliven is one of the few cities where worship is mostly in the vernacular,
thanks to the initiative of local choirmaster Metod Grigorov, son of a priest, and the support of
Metropolitan Ioanniki.13
The most recent major confrontation has been in the port of Varna. Its most flourishing
congregation, St. Athanasius, with its best priest, a lecturer in theology and former diocesan secretary,
Liubomir Popov, last year left the diocese and switched to the alternative synod following months of
occupation and counter-occupation of the church after its metropolitan Kiril sacked Fr. Liubomir. Kiril
was installed in 1989 thanks to his uncle Hristo Marinchev, who happened to be head of the BRA and a
top-ranking security officer.  Stefanov rates his sermons as poor and ill-prepared. The press reflects
popular sentiments. Dnevik's editorial pleaded for “Kiril's brothers in the Synod to bring him to his
senses. People are sick and tired of this drunkard and mafia stooge and are ready to elect new leaders.”
Standart commented, “It raises a question of growing poignancy within the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church whether laypeople have any voice in church matters or whether decisions are taken by a
hierarchy which is not accountable to anyone.” The diocesan secretary for the last 19 years, Boris
Iordanov, along with Popov and two other priests who have joined the rival synod, produced a
document proving that their metropolitan drew the equivalent of $12,000 from the bank of the
metropolia, in cash, for his nephew Milen Petrov to travel abroad. The dissentient clergy claim that
priest loyal to Kiril carry firearms and frequent striptease shows.14
Despite its often precarious legal status during the schism, the canonical Bulgarian Orthodox
Church can still count on and exploit the support of the majority of Bulgarians and of the new SNM
government which replaced the second and duly discredited UDF government in 2001. The Law of
Confessions which was finally passed in December 2002 after years of debate and deferment came
down unequivocally on the side of the canonical church. It is in some respects, in its continuing tight
supervision of religious life, from the same stable as its 1948 predecessors, which gave the communists
a stranglehold over church life. It recognizes only one Orthodox Church, that of Patriarch Maksim and
the Holy Synod. 
Although the law specifies that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has no greater rights than
other faiths, the minority churches are uneasy because only it enjoys freedom from interference by the
BRA. The law tries to resolve the property problem once and for all. The raskolniks are allowed to
register as a church under any new name they choose but all property reverts to the canonical church.
That is the theory; in practice the truculent raskolnik priest and spokesman Emil Barakov warned of
more bloodshed when his church has to defend its property. More likely, as the Bulgarian Helsinki
Felix Corley, “Religious minorities object to religion bill”; “Bulgaria : religion bill favours1 5
Orthodox Patriarchate,” KESTON NEWS SERVICE, 17 December 2002.
Corley, “Bulgaria; controversial Religion Law survives constitutional challenge,” FORUM 1816
NEWS SERVICE, 21 July 2003.
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Committee pointed out, they may put their case to Strasburg and the Bulgarian taxpayer could have to
bear the long-term cost of reparation to the synod for loss of property!15
For most Bulgarians and the canonical church the new law presents no problem as it seems to
settle the schism and take firm measures to defend Bulgaria and Orthodoxy from what they regard as a
sectarian invasion. But among minority faiths such was the dissatisfaction with the finished product
that eighteen out of thirty-one registered religious organizations protested. Raskolniks, Catholics,
Muslims and Evangelicals joined in an unprecedented public demonstration. Its basic premises, that
religious bodies must be subject to restrictions which do not apply to any other non-government
associations and that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church alone enjoys immunity from state interference,
are completely unjust and contravene the constitution of the European Court of Human Rights which
the government has already signed as a prior requisite to its joining the European Community in 2007
(now postponed until 2010). Two legal experts from the Council of Europe made this clear in May
2003 in what was only a limited overview. Its byzantine complexities and apparent ignorance or
defiance of accepted international legal norms throw Bulgarian law as a whole into disrepute. The law
has not dismantled the BRA but extended its powers, under a new director; theology lecturer Ivan
Zhelev Dimitrov, Maksim's former secretary, whom the new government had appointed in place of the
rabidly pro-schismatic Lyuben Mladenov when he reached retirement age. All denominations, the
canonical church excepted, have to re-register with the Sofia municipal court. 
On the other hand, the status of minorities and the extension of spheres in which they can
work have improved over the last few years and created a favorable impression in many places.
Positive features of the law include permitting registered churches to open their own educational,
medical and social institutions, subject to inspection by the respective ministries. Nevertheless, some
restrictive provisions add an element of uncertainty. There is no way of telling how certain local
councils hostile to minorities-- Burgas for instance--will implement the law, clamping down on
unwelcome groups who want to construct new buildings, hold open air services or hire halls for
worship.
To the dismay of raskolnik supporters and the minority faiths, in an unprecedented and very
dubious decision, the Constitutional court overturned an appeal from fifty UDF deputies against the
official status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church on 15 July 2003. Zhelev Dimitrov maintained that he
was merely an executive, that all 31 registered religions would be automatically re-registered, and
commented that although it had created the schism even the UDF government had never registered
their alternative synod.  Though the canonical church is now firmly entrenched it has long lost its hold16
on the majority of Bulgarians and the schism seems set to continue.
For those who want further detail of most aspects covered in this article, see the following articles of17
Janice Broun in RELIGION, STATE AND SOCIETY: 
1. “The Schism in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church,” RSS vol 21, no 2, 1993; 
2. “The Schism...Part 2; under the Socialist Government, 1993-97,” RSS vol 28, no 3, 2000;
3. “The Schism....Part 3; under the Second UDF Government, 1997-2001,” RSS vol 30, no 4, 2002.
(No 2 can be found at ISSN 0963-7494 print/ISSN 1465-3974 online/00/030263-27@2000 Keston
Institute; no 3 at 40365-30@2002 Keston Institute.)
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One specific measure in the new law, to allow the Board to prohibit the entry of foreign
religious activists, though it could be employed to keep out 'sectarians' is primarily meant to bar radical
fundamentalist Muslims who it is feared might threaten to destabilize the well-integrated, moderately
religious, mainly Turkish, Muslim community. Strategically, in the aftermath of September 11, this is
of key importance to the USA which played host to a visit from Chief Mufti Selim Mehmet. Simeon
came to power with promises which could not be realized and his government has predictably lost
support. The BSP could return to power; much depends on the Muslim party, the Movement for Rights
and Freedoms, which under Ahmed Dogan, the most astute politician in post-communist Bulgaria, has
for a decade adroitly held the balance of power in Bulgarian politics. There is now a very justified fear
that Bulgaria, which has amicable links with Turkey, could be subject to the same violence as
Istanbul.17
